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Is Debt Relief as Good as Liquidity? The Impact of Prospective Student 
Debt on Post-secondary Attendance among Low-income Youth 
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In this study, I estimate the impact of offering two large non-refundable grants to low-income 
Canadian youth on postsecondary attendance. The grants had two interesting features. First, 
they were clawed back from loans, thus reducing costs but providing no additional liquidity. 
Second, the grants were only available to students if parental income was below a fixed 
threshold. This sharp discontinuity in the offer of the grants provides for near ideal conditions 
to study their causal impact, closely mimicking random assignment. Despite the large size of 
the grants (up to $6,000 or $7,000), the fact that students were automatically assessed for the 
grants with their regular student loans application, and evidence that most Canadian youth are 
at least aware of non-refundable study grant opportunities, I find that the grants had no 
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Executive Summary 
 
Previous research suggests that student financial aid generally  reduces  liquidity 
constraints, and consequently, helps improve access to postsecondary studies. 
However, rising student debt load is also  a concern. Student debt may have an 
impact on post-graduate outcomes (e.g. job quality, life outcomes), while prospective 
student debt may impact the decision to enroll in postsecondary education (PSE) in 
the first place since it affects costs. This study is devoted to analyzing the latter of 
these two hypotheses by studying the introduction of two large non-refundable 
grants made available to low-income youth in Canada (The Canada Access Grants 
for Low-Income youth and the Millennium Access Bursaries). An interesting aspect 
of these grants is that they help reduce debt, but they have no impact on liquidity 
constraints since they are simply clawed back from loans. Furthermore, there is a 
sharp discontinuity in the eligibility criteria, based on parental income. These two 
features provide near ideal conditions for studying the causal impact of prospective 
debt on PSE attendance, while holding liquidity constant. To date, no study in the 
world has looked at prospective debt load and PSE attendance under these 
circumstances. 
 
Using a large longitudinal administrative data set of Canadian youth that is linked to 
their parents, I find no evidence that the reduction in prospective debt offered 
through the grants impacted PSE or university attendance. This is despite the fact 
that the grants were large (up to $6,000 or $7,000), students were automatically 
assessed for the grants with their regular student loans application, and most youth 
were at least aware of non-refundable grant opportunities. However, it is possible 
that students may not have been well informed about the mechanics of the grants. 
Although they had to apply and qualify for a Canada Student Loan (CSL) to obtain a 
grant, they did not need to take up the loan. Unfortunately, no evidence exists to 
support this hypothesis.  
 
Important  policy considerations are worth noting  from these findings. First, the 
primary purpose of student aid is to raise access to PSE. Based on the results of this 
study and others, liquidity may be a more important factor in this decision than 
prospective debt. The windfall economic rents collected by students who would have 
attended in the absence of the grants  could perhaps have been better directed 
towards reducing liquidity constraints  for those facing them. Although Canadian 
students generally have all of their financial needs met with regards to attending PSE 
through government aid, this is not necessarily the case for all groups. In particular, 
students who are raised in remote areas must pay additional costs to attend 
university, and the ability of student loans to cover those costs is constrained by loan 
limits, which are no higher for these students.  
 
Another policy consideration is the level of debt accumulated by PSE students. To 
this end, the grants no doubt succeeded as they represent an automatic reduction in 
debt. However, very little evidence exists to support the notion that debt matters in 
terms of post-graduate outcomes. More work is needed in this area, particularly with 
respect to identifiying exogenous variation in student debt. The grants studied here 
may serve this purpose quite well in the future.  
   3 
Introduction 
 
Previous  research suggests that student financial aid generally helps reduce liquidity 
constraints, and consequently, helps improve access to postsecondary studies. However, 
rising student debt load is also a concern. Student debt may have an impact on post-graduate 
outcomes (e.g. job quality, life outcomes), while prospective student debt may impact the 
decision to enroll in postsecondary education (PSE) in the first place since it affects costs. 
This  study  is devoted to analyzing the latter of these two hypotheses  by  studying the 
introduction  of two  large non-refundable grants  made available to low-income youth  in 
Canada  (The Canada Access Grants for Low-Income youth and the Millennium Access 
Bursaries). An interesting aspect of these grants is that they help reduce debt, but they have 
no impact on liquidity constraints since they are simply clawed back from loans. Furthermore, 
there is a sharp discontinuity in the eligibility criteria, based on parental income. These two 
features provide near ideal conditions for studying the causal impact of prospective debt on 
PSE attendance, while holding liquidity constraints constant. To date, no study in the world 
has looked at prospective debt load and PSE attendance under these circumstances. 
 
Using a large longitudinal administrative data set of Canadian youth that is linked to their 
parents, I find no evidence that the reduction in prospective debt offered through the grants 
impacted PSE or university attendance. This is despite the fact that the grants were large (up 
to $6,000 or $7,000), students were automatically assessed for the grants with their regular 
student loans application, and most appeared to have been at least aware of non-refundable 
grant opportunities in general. However, it is possible that students may not have been well 
informed about the mechanics of the grants. Although they had to apply and qualify for a   4 
Canada Student Loan (CSL) to obtain a grant, they did not need to take up the  loan. 
Unfortunately, no evidence exists to support this hypothesis.  
 
These findings, coupled with previous research on the impact of relaxing liquidity constraints, 
are consistent with the notion that PSE attendance is more responsive to short term liquidity 
constraints than to the long-term costs of attending PSE. The results are also consistent with 
the grants providing sizeable economic rents in the form of debt relief among students who 
would have attended PSE without the grants. The policy implication is that the grants could 
have been better spent on providing more aid for liquidity-constrained youth. 
  
In the next section, I review the relevant literature on the impact of liquidity constraints and 
prospective debt on PSE attendance.  Next,  I  summarize the Canadian postsecondary 
education system, with special attention paid to its fee structure and financial aid system. The 
remainder of the study is devoted to the empirical analysis. To this end, I begin by discussing 
the identification strategy and data in the methods section. The empirical results are presented 
in the next section. Finally, the study is summarized and the findings put into perspective in 




The main purpose of student financial aid is to reduce liquidity constraints for students 
contemplating attending postsecondary schooling. The Canadian and US student financial aid 




 Furthermore, most studies have found that reducing liquidity constraints have been 
effective in raising attendance. The early studies were reviewed by Leslie and Brinkman 
(1988). The consensus finding from these studies is that a $1,000 decrease in the net price of 
college (fees less non-refundable aid) is associated with an increase in postsecondary 
enrolment of 3 to 5 percentage points in the US.  
The limitation of many of these early cross-sectional studies is that they are largely based on 
observed correlations. Students with similar characteristics are more likely to attend 
postsecondary if they receive aid. However, as Dynarski (2002) points out, many 
characteristics are unobserved, and this may have severely limited the credibility of the early 
evidence presented in Leslie and Brinkman (1988). To better understand the relationship 
between aid and attendance, Dynarski suggests that researchers should focus on identifying 
random variation in the price of postsecondary. 
 
This has been the general direction of the literature over the past couple of decades. For 
example, many of the studies focus on temporal variation in student aid derived from natural 
experiments. Changes in student aid policies provide such variation, and the US is not short 
                                                 
1  Frenette (2009a) provides direct empirical evidence that supports this claim. The study shows that only 10% 
of high school graduates from Canada claimed to not have attended university (despite wanting to do so) due 
to their financial situation (including a lack of credit). Studies in the US also come to the same general 
conclusion using different methods. For example, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) found that, at most, 8% of 
youth are credit constrained in terms of PSE access. They identified credit constraints by using a residual 
approach: they suggest that the unexplained portion of the gap in attendance rates between high- and low-
income youth is due to credit constraints, under the assumption that high-income youth (those in the top 
quartile) are not credit constrained. Belley and Lochner (2007) update this work and find that the proportion 
doubled in recent years (to about 17%).   6 
on this front. The majority of aid provided to American students comes from the Pell Grants 
and the Stafford Loans. The Pell Grants were initially offered in 1974, when they were 
named the Basic Educational Opportunity Grants. Pell Grants are needs-based, and form the 
majority of federal grants for students in the US. Aside from grants, US students could also 
secure federally-sponsored loans. In 1965, the Guaranteed Student Loan Program was created, 
which was later renamed the Stafford Loan Program in 1987.  
 
Kane (1995) noted that Pell Grants had no impact on attendance when they were introduced 
in the 1970s, a period when real tuition was relatively stable. The resulting supply constraints 
may have prevented enrolment from rising despite the increased aid. This view was supported 
by McPherson and Shapiro (1991), who looked at estimated the impact of the grants in the 
1980s—a period when tuition fees rose—and found that a $1,000 increase in the Pell Grant 
was associated with a 6.8 percentage point increase in the enrolment of low-income students. 
 
An alternative view was presented by Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2008), who argued that 
the complexity in the system may have discouraged students to apply. They contrast the Pell 
Grant system with the relatively simpler Georgia Hope Scholarship and similar programs, 
noting that research has consistently pointed to significant effects in the latter, but not the 
former.      
 
Arguably, the studies related to the Pell Grant system were not able to implement a 
compelling identification strategy. This is because the system was introduced in 1974 and 
was targeted at low-income youth. National level changes in enrolment rates pre- and post-
treatment by income class is hardly a desirable research design.    7 
In contrast, the Georgia Hope Scholarship (GHS) and similar programs did offer more 
promising avenues of research. Dynarski (2000) examined the GHS, which was a merit-based 
aid package offered to college students in the US state of Georgia beginning in 1993. 
Students who obtained a B average in high school were eligible for the grant. Specifically, 
eligible students who resided in Georgia could attend any of Georgia’s state colleges for free. 
 
Dynarski (2000) finds that a $1,000 increase in student aid is associated with a 3.7 to 4.2 
percentage point increase in enrolment compared to nearby ‘control’ states. However, since 
merit is based on grades, and grades tend to rise with parental affluence, the gap in enrolment 
between high- and low-income students rose following the GHS.  
 
In Dynarski (2003), the same author adopts a very different identification strategy. Social 
Security is a monthly benefit available to elderly Americans. Prior to 1965, benefits were also 
allocated to children of deceased, disabled, or retired Social Security beneficiaries as long as 
they were in school full-time and less than 18 years old. Between 1965 and 1982, the benefits 
to children were extended to college or university age children. Specifically, 18 to 22 year-
old children of deceased, disabled, or retired Social Security beneficiaries received monthly 
payments if they were enrolled in school full-time (most students were enrolled in 
postsecondary schooling at that age). The average annual payment in 1980 was $6,700 (in 
2000 US dollars). In 1982, the extension beyond age 18 was terminated. Using a differences-
in-differences approach with the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), and a 
proxy for Social Security beneficiaries (a deceased father), Dynarski (2003) finds that the 
elimination of the extended benefits led to a decline in postsecondary attendance. Specifically, 
a $1,000 decrease in benefits (a form of  aid since it is tied to education) led to a 3.6 
percentage point decline in enrolment.   8 
Around the same time, van der Klaauw (2002) exploited discontinuities in financial aid rules 
at one US East Coast college. Using administrative data on students who applied to the 
college, he finds that aid increases enrolment. While the identification approach in this 
study—a regression discontinuity design—is very strong, it does not address the relationship 
between aid and enrolment in general; rather, it looks at aid in the form of helping a specific 
college compete for students.  
      
Some recent reforms in Europe provide the groundwork for compelling research in the area. 
Baumgartner and Steiner (2006) use the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) to examine 
a German reform in student aid in 2001. Using a differences-in-differences approach (pre-
/post-reform for low-/high-  income students), the authors find no statistically significant 
relationship between aid and enrolment. However, unlike the US system, the German 
postsecondary system was well-funded to begin with: loans and non-refundable grants 
covering all costs were already available to students in need. 
 
A similar reform in Denmark in 1988 was studied by Nielsen, Sørensen, and Taber (2010). 
Using a longitudinal register of high school graduates from the classes of 1985 to 1990, they 
find that a $1,000 increase in aid is associated with a 1.35 percentage point increase in 
college enrolment. Although the effect is significant (in a statistical sense), it is somewhat 
smaller than the US findings. Once again, this could be due to the funding in place in 
Denmark prior to the 1988 reform. In fact, tuition was already free in that country.  
 
In Canada, I could only locate two studies that assess the impact of additional aid on 
attendance. The first is by Neill (2008), who adopts an empirical strategy that largely exploits 
the increase in the loan and grant limits in the Canada Student Loans Program in the mid-  9 
1990s to study their impact on university attendance among 18 to 23 year olds with the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS). She uses students in Québec as a comparison group since they 
apply for aid through a separate program (Aide financière aux etude - AFE), which gradually 
adjusts its aid limits over time.  
 
Although the study differentiates between variation in loan and grant limit, it notes that 
increases in loan limits were usually associated with an increase in the amount of the grant 
received during the period of study since most grants have generally been clawed-back from 
loans in recent years; however, grants awarded were not available in the data. What this 
means in practical terms is that the variation in loan limits exploited in the study actually 
referred in large part to increases in non-repayable aid. More liquidity was offered, but it is 
largely non-repayable liquidity. The study found that increasing the loan limit (non-repayable 
grants awarded, effectively) had no impact on university attendance. However, a $1,000 
increase in the grant limit was associated with a one percentage point increase in overall 
enrolment.  
 
These estimates are lower than what has typically been found in the US. One possible reason 
is that changing the loan limit is only expected to affect those with unmet needs since the 
amount of loans will not change for those whose needs are fully met. Second, the study could 
not identify students from low-income families, the group that may be most affected by 
increased aid. Finally, the results may be also be lower than expected because of the inclusion 
of older students in the analysis, a group who may be less sensitive to enrolment decisions. 
Although Neill found similar results when the analysis was limited to 18 to 20 year olds, a 20 
year old may have already decided to pursue college or work, as opposed to attend university.   10 
Furthermore, for the time period covered by the study, both Ontario and Québec students 
generally did not begin university until the year they became 19. 
 
A second Canadian study (Neill and Kapsalis, 2010) takes advantage of longitudinal 
administrative data to address some of the challenges faced in Neill’s earlier study. 
Specifically, the authors use the Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD) and the Needs 
Assessment Records (NARS) to identify parental income and the amount of loans that youth 
are eligible to receive. They find that a $1,000 increase in loans that students are estimated to 
be eligible to receive is associated with a 0.85 of a percentage increase in enrolment among 
18 to 21 year-old women from low-income families. For men, no associated is found.  
 
Given the superior data, these results are more convincing than those in Neill (2008). 
However, they still stand in stark contrast from US findings. Furthermore, they may not be 
entirely credible for at least three reasons. First, as in Neill (2008), the focus on older students 
may dilute whatever impact may exist. Second, the parental income threshold for defining 
low-income families is somewhat higher than in most studies ($60,000). In fact, about 40% 
of youth in the sample are classified as low-income. Finally, the aid that youth are eligible to 
receive had to be estimated from the NARS data, and then brought over to the LAD, using 
predictors that are common to both data sets. This is expected to generate random 
measurement error. Since the aid variable is used as an independent variable in the university 
attendance model, we expect this random measurement error to generate attenuation bias (i.e. 
bias towards zero). Given all of these reasons, it is thus not entirely surprising that the study 
only finds small (and inconsistent) effects. 
   11 
A second concern of the student financial aid system is the debt load that students carry with 
them upon graduation. This is especially so in Canada given that tuition fees have been 
increasing substantially over the last two decades. Between 1990 and 2006, real tuition fees 




Does prospective debt influence attendance, given that students generally have enough 
money to attend university or college? Human capital theory would suggest so, as a reduction 
in prospective debt represents a decline the costs of attending postsecondary. Surprisingly, 
there are only three relevant empirical studies. The studies have all surfaced in recent years. 
The first is from Germany (Baumgartner and Steiner, 2004), where a substantial reform to the 
loan repayment schedule was implemented in 1990. Prior to that year, student aid was in the 
form of loans, which had to be repaid in full. Following the reform, only half of the aid had to 
be repaid. This represented a significant reduction in debt for eligible students. The authors 
report that a fully supported student saw their debt load reduced by 23,500 EUR. Using the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the authors estimate a differences-in-differences 
model, the results of which suggest that the aid reform was ineffective in raising enrolment 
rates.  
 
Linsenmeier et al. (2006) examine a significant program change at a major northeastern US 
university (ANON U). Prior to 1998, the university’s financial aid package available to 
freshmen from low-income families consisted of grants, loans, and jobs. Beginning with the 
1998 freshmen class, the loan component of the aid package was converted to non-refundable 
grants. Using admissions and financial aid data from the university, the authors used a 
                                                 
2  Sources: Tuition and Living Accomodation Costs (TLAC) survey, National Graduates Survey   (NGS), and 
Canadian University Survey Consortium (CUSC).   12 
differences-in-differences approach and found that the loan reduction program had no 
statistically significant impact on the probability of enrolment at ANON U. However, for 
low-income minority students, loan reduction was associated with an increase in the 
probability of enrolment (significant at 10% only).  
 
One additional study in this area is worth noting, this time based on a social experiment. Field 
(2009) examines enrolment rates of New York University (NYU) law students in various 
areas of law. The experiment was set up to test the hypothesis that debt matters to students. In 
total, 140 students were randomly assigned to one of two groups.  The treatment group 
received a non-refundable grant if they pursued a public interest law career. The control 
group received a loan that would be forgiven for up to 10 years following graduation if they 
pursued a career in ‘public interest law’ (i.e. legal fields with a public good aspect to it, which 
often is lower-paying than other forms of law). In both cases, the amount of aid covered two-
thirds of tuition fees. The results suggest that the treatment group was twice as likely to enroll 
in a public interest field of law, and substantially more likely to hold a first job in public 
interest law. 
 
The results of the NYU study stands in contrast to those of Baumgartner and Steiner (2004) 
and Linsenmeier et al. (2006). However, the study by Field is very different in scope. It 
focuses on students  who are already enriolled in a specific program, and thus, does not 
examine the decision to enroll (only the decision to specialize in a certain field of law). 
Moreover, the level of debt reduction is quite substantial. Law students at NYU can expect to 
pay about $40,000 in tuition fees. Waiving two-thirds of their debt is likely to have an impact, 
especially since the decision to enroll at NYU Law School was already made, and only the 
specialization had to be changed.    13 
 
In summary, the literature on liquidity constraints and postsecondary access is well developed. 
It points to liquidity as playing a major role in the decision to pursue higher education, except 
in some Europeen countries where tuition fees are generally lower and/or financial aid is 
usually more generous. In contrast, the evidence on the impact of prospective debt is scarcer 
and the evidence that does exist is mixed.  The one study that looks at the impact of 
prospective debt on postsecondary attendance finds no impact.   
 
The current study contributes to the literature by estimating the impact of two broad-based, 
large non-refundable grants offered to low-income Canadian students. The identification 
strategy is based on a sharp discontinuity of the offer of the grants, which is a first in this 
particular branch of the literature.  
 




Postsecondary schooling generally includes three types of institutions in Canada: university, 
college, and trade school. However, trade school doesn’t necessarily require a high school 
diploma for entry. University and college generally require a high school diploma, although 
some students may be eligible to begin postsecondary studies without a high school diploma 
if they are deemed to be ‘mature students’ (i.e. usually 21 years old or above). A typical 
university undergraduate degree takes four years to complete, which may be followed by a 
graduate degree (a Master’s or a PhD) or a professional degree (Medicine, Dentistry, Law, 
                                                 
3  This overview generally describes the situation in most Canadian provinces. Québec stands out on many 
fronts, but as we shall see, this province is not included in the current study.   14 
etc.) A college diploma can normally be obtained after two or three years of study, while a 
trade school diploma is even shorter in duration. 
 
With the exception of the small number of private career colleges and some elite professional 
university  programs, postsecondary institutions are heavily  regulated  by government. 
Provincial governments usually set a price ceiling on tuition fees, although they often allow 
for some variability in tuition fees to reflect differences in costs. To ensure that the price 
ceiling does not reduce enrolment too much, governments provide supply side subsidies to 
universities for every student enrolled. Fees are not always regulated, although de facto price 
ceilings still exist since subsidies are reduced when tuition increases. Since tuition is in effect 
frozen in Canada, increased aid is not likely to have an impact on total enrolment. However, 
aid may raise enrolment among the group to which it is targeted (at the expense of others).  
 
Average undergraduate tuition fees are generally about $4,000 at Canadian universities, with 
some variability by province and program. Although Statistics Canada no longer maintains 
data on college tuition fees, they are generally about half that of university fees. College 
tuition fees are generally similar across programs and provinces.  
 
The federal and provincial governments provide direct funding for postsecondary education 
through non-merit based aid in the form of loans and grants (including loan remissions). All 
provinces (except Québec) and the Yukon Territory co-ordinate their provincial student aid 
systems with the federal Canada Student Loans Programs (CSLP), with the costs shared 
between the federal and provincial levels. The bulk of this aid is in the form of student loans. 
When students apply for loans, they may also qualify for special grants that are generally 
targeted at low income youth. This process is automatic with the loan application. Applying   15 
applying for a Canada Student Loan (CSL) is required to be assessed for a grant, the loan 
need not be accepted in order to obtain the grant. The amount of student aid that students are 
eligible to receive is governed by the needs assessment: Assessed Needs = Total costs – Total 
resources, where Total costs correspond to the costs associated with attending the program 
(tuition, other fees, books, living costs, return travel, etc.), and Total resources correspond to 
parental and student income and assets (with considerations for other parental obligations), as 
well as other resources. If costs exceed resources, applicants will generally be offered loans 
to cover the gap. However, there is a limit on the amount of loans they can receive, which 
may be binding for certain students facing high direct costs of attending, or perhaps very low 
resources. In these situations, students have ‘unmet needs’ (needs that the CSL will not cover 
due to loan limits). 
 
Since aid is already available to most students in need, policy has recently shifted towards 
easing debtloads. I begin the next section by discussing two grants designed with this purpose 




To identify the impact of prospective student debt load on PSE attendance, an important 
ingredient would be an exogenous increase in expected debt, but with no change in total 
student financial aid (liquidity) provided. The implementation of the Canada Access Grant 
for Low-Income youth (CAG-LI) and the Millenium Access Bursaries (MAB) provides such 
a setting.  
   16 
The CAG-LI consists of a non-refundable grant whereby loans are clawed back by the 
amount of the grant. In other words, CAG-LI does not provide more aid to students. Rather, it 
changes the amount of aid that must be repaid. Another convenient aspect of the grant is that 
students are eligible for the full grant if their parental income is below a certain threshold. If 
parental income is above the threshold (even by $0.01), students are not eligible for the grant. 
Thus, there is a sharp discontinuity in the amount of the non-refundable grant available (and 
therefore, debt) around the threshold. The threshold mimics random assignment of debt near 
the threshold since students with parents who have very similar incomes are likely to be quite 
similar in their PSE choices in absence of the CAG-LI.  
 
The CAG-LI first became available to students in the 2005-06 academic year. The grant 
applies to first-year, full-time PSE students only. The amount of the CAG-LI is one half of 
first year tuition, up to a limit of $3,000. Eligibility is based on the net income of the 
parent(s), as per line 236 of their income tax return in the previous year. Net income consists 
of the sum of employment income, other market income (e.g. investment income, rental 
income, etc.), transfer income (including Social Assistance, Employment Insurance, Old Age 
Security, etc., but excluding the Child Tax Benefit and the National Child Benefit 
Supplement, and the Goods and Services and Harmonized Sales Tax Credit), minus certain 
deductions such as Registered Pension Plan contributions, union dues, etc.
 4 The threshold for 
CAG-LI eligibility is the same threshold used for the National Child Benefit Supplement 
(NCBS), which is around $35,000, depending on family size and year.
5
                                                 
4  Of these income components, perhaps the easiest to manipulate (in order to qualify for the grants) is the 
contributions to a Registered Pension Plan. I will investigate later whether or not net income was manipulated. 
  
5  The NCBS income does not create a discontinuity of its own since it does not jump suddenly at the threshold. 
Rather, it goes from zero when net income is above the threshold, to a small (near zero) amount just below the   17 
 
The CAG-LI coincided with the introduction of a similar grant: the Millenium Access 
Bursary (MAB). In four provinces, the MAB worked in a very similar way as CAG-LI in that 
eligibility for both programs were based on the NCBS threshold. In Prince-Edward-Island 
(beginning in 2006), Ontario (beginning in 2005) and Manitoba (beginning in 2006), the 
MAB was also similar to CAG-LI in terms of the amount of the grant (i.e. one half of tuition, 
up to a limit of $3,000). In New Brunswick (beginning in 2006), the grant was larger (up to 
$4,000), but was spread out over three years. In other provinces, different versions of the 
MAB were available, but in all of those cases, no clear discontinuities could be identified 
based on program parameters. In the four provinces listed above, the combination of CAG-LI 
and MAB provided up to $6,000 ($7,000 in New Brunswick) in debt reduction for qualified 
students, although the actual amount of the grants depended on tuition fees.  
 
For both grants, students need only apply and qualify for a CSL to receive the grants. No 
additional application is necessary and the loans can be rejected without comprosing the offer 




To identify the effect of the grants, I adopt two econometric approaches. The first is a simple 
differences-in-differences approach, whereby I compare enrolment rates of youth who were 
eligible for the NCBS before and after their introduction to youth who were not eligible. This 
                                                                                                                                                        
threshold. The NCBS amount gradually increases as net income falls further below the threshold. Details are 
available at http://www.nationalchildbenefit.ca/eng/o4/chap2.shtml.   
6  This is among students who were enrolled in the first-year of full-time studies at a post-secondary institution. 
This is not entirely surprising, as the grants represent free money to students. Thanks to Malgorzata 
Winizewska from the Canada Student Loans Program at Human Resources and Skills Development Canada 
and to Anne Motte from the Canadian Millenium Scholarship Foundation for confirming this point.     18 
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, where ENROL is a dummy variable for PSE or university enrolment, NCBS is a dummy 
variable indicating eligibility for the program (treatment stauts), YEAR is a vector of year 
dummies, X is a vector of contol variables (described later), and i denotes the individual . 
 
The second approach takes advantage of the sharp discontinuity in grant eligibility. In a sharp 
regression discontinuity design, assignment to the treatment has a deterministic impact on 
treatment status (i.e. the take-up rate is 100%). In this case, all youth assigned to receive the 
treatment (grant eligibility) will receive that treatment by design (i.e. all are eligible). Very 
close to the cutoff (denoted by the NCBS threshold), the treatment status should be 
orthogonal to all observed and unobserved characteristics that determine the outcome. In 
other words, individuals just above and just below the threshold should be identical except 
for the treatment they receive. 
 
More formally, let PARINC  denote the assignment variable (parental income), PARINC0 
denote the income cutoff, the vector Z denote all observed and unobserved characteristics 
determining enrolment status, and and all else as before. We then have: 
 
, 0     1





PARINC i PARINC if
PARINC i PARINC if i NCBS  and 
                                                 
7  Logit and probit models yield similar results.   19 








If these  assumptions hold,  the  design will closely mimic random assignment. For an 
evaluation of regression discontinuity that uses random assignment as a benchmark, see 
Buddelmeyer and Skoufias (2003). 
 
For estimation purposes, I adopt a local polynomial regression discontinuity method (Nichols, 
2007). This approach identifies the impact of the discontinuity by estimating separate local 
polynomial  (or kernel) regressions of a given bandwidth size on both sides of  the 
discontinuity.
8 Once again, the outcome variable is postsecondary enrolment. I estimate the 




The data required to conduct this study should contain information on PSE attendance of 
youth, their parental income, the province of residence, and a sufficiently large sample to 
allow one to look very closely around the point of discontinuity. The Canadian Longitudinal 
Administrative Databank (LAD), developed by Statistics Canada,  satisfies all of these 
                                                 
8  I specifiy a bandwidth size of 100 and use estimate a triangle kernel function (the preferred method in the 
literature). The robustness of the results will be tested by altering the size of the bandwidth. Standard errors 
are calculated by bootstrapping.  
9  Although  far from  common in the literature, applying a regression discontinuity estimator  to a binary 
dependent variable is not unique. For example, see Buddelmeyer and Skoufias (2003), who model child labor 
market participation and school enrolment  with a linear probability model in a regression discontinuity 
framework. Lemieux and Milligan (2008) apply regression discontinuity to study employment. Given the 
large sample size they had to work with (men across Canada in the Census micro-data), they were able to 
create large cells by single year age groups. A similar approach was not possible in the current study since 
cell sizes were not large enough around the point of discontinuity.      20 
requirements. The LAD is built from personal income tax records (the T1s). The T1 data are 
combined into families to form the T1 Family File (T1FF). The T1FF contains records of all 
tax filers, as well as their non-filing dependents.
10 The LAD is a 20% simple random sample 
of T1FF, with the records linked longitudinally (until they leave the sample through death, 
out-migration, or if everyone in their family stops filing taxes).
11
 
 Currently, data are available 
from 1982 to 2006. 
Since CAG-LI and MAB apply to first year students, it is necessary to identify the year in 
which youth become eligible for first year enrolment in PSE. In six of the 10 Canadian 
provinces (Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, 
and British Columbia), this is simply the year in which the youth turned 18.
12 This is because 
age of entry in those provinces is determined based on one’s age as of December 31. In the 
LAD, we know the year of birth for all children
13
                                                 
10 Dependents are imputed through information provided by tax filers on their returns. This includes spouses and 
children. The population coverage in T1FF is about 97% compared to census data.  
, allowing one to identify the year when 
11 Since 1993, virtually all families with children (even ones with low incomes) have had an incentive to file 
taxes in Canada. This is largely because of the introduction of the Child Tax Benefit, which is available to 
about 90% of families with children below the age of 18. 
12It is of course possible that students take a ‘gap-year’ (i.e. they begin postsecondary studies after taking a 
year-long break following high school). This can pose a problem if we only focus on 18 year olds and there is 
a systematic bias in the propensity to take a gap-year by parental income level. According to Finnie and 
Johnson (2011), 32% of post-secondary students from Ontario took a gap-year following high school. 
However, their econometric evidence suggests that there is no statistical relationship between taking a gap-
year and parental income, both for college and university students. 
13 Unless they are tax filers themselves, in which case we know the exact date of birth. However, many children 
do not file taxes, so a certain degree of bias might be introduced by selecting children with detailed birth date 
information.   21 
youth first become eligible for PSE attendance. Of the six provinces, CAG-LI and MAB were 
quite similar in New Brunswick, Ontario and Manitoba.
14
 
 For these reasons, analysis is 
limited to those three provinces. Finally, note that prior to 2003 in Ontario, students could 
normally only begin university at age 19 (they could begin college at age 18). Since 2003, 
both college and university normally begin at age 18. For consistency, analysis is limited to 
the 2003-2006 period.  




•  Full-time PSE attendance in year t (age 18) 
o  This is derived from full-time tuition credits and full-time education 
deductions. If either of these is greater than zero, then the indicator is set to 1. 
o  These credits/deductions can be transferred to a higher income family member 
(specifically, a parent); since the late 1990s, we can identify which family 




                                                 
14 CAG-LI and MAB were also quite similar in Prince-Edward-Island, but their school entry laws are based on 
age as of January 31.  
 
15 Many of these variables are captured in year (t-1), at age 17, since in year t, many youth may move from the 
parental home in order to attend PSE. As such, their ‘family’ on the tax files may simply consist of 
themselves. All variables derived from this family will thus omit information on their parents, their parental 
home, their siblings, etc. Note also that even if youth tried to strategically move out of their home at age 17   22 
 
•  Net parental income in year (t-1) 
o  This variable will be used to identify eligibility for CAG-LI and MAB by 
mapping the relevant NCBS threshold to each family. 
•  Province in year (t-1) 
•  Lone-parent family dummy in year (t-1) 
•  Number of children in family in year (t-1) 
•  Sex of the youth 
 
The means of the variables used in the analysis and sample sizes appear below in Table 1.
16
                                                                                                                                                        
(to lower their income in hopes of qualifying for the grants), this would have no bearing on grant eligibility 
since parental income is used in determining eligibility. 
 
Slightly fewer than half of 18 year olds have attended PSE. There is some provincial 
variability in this figure, which is not surprising given that each province has its own 
postsecondary education system. Parental income also varies by province (highest in Ontario, 
lowest in New Brunswick, among the three affected provinces). Note that parental income 
among this sample is relatively high since only families with at least one child of age 17 are 
included here (i.e. they are relatively older families). About one in five youth live in families 
with income that is sufficiently low to qualify them for the NCBS (and thus, the CAG-LI and 
MAB grants in certain years). The other variables—lone-parent status, the number of children 
in the family, and sex—are included as control variables. Of interest is the fact that slightly 
16 For confidentiality reasons, all reported dollar estimates from LAD must be rounded to the nearest 100, while 
all sample sizes must be rounded to the nearest 5. Note that only the published results are rounded. The actual 
micro-data I use in the calculations are not rounded.   23 
less than 50% of the sample consists of females. This is because 17 year-old males are more 
likely to remain in their parental home than 17 year-old females.  
  
Table 1: Sample means of variables used in analysis
New Brunswick Ontario Manitoba
Full-time PSE attendance 0.482 0.426 0.376
Net parental income 65,600 99,600 77,900
Below NCBS threshold 0.259 0.178 0.210
Lone-parent family 0.139 0.134 0.133
Number of children in family 2.5 2.8 2.8
Female 0.464 0.490 0.476
N 3,705 56,735 5,530
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at
age 17, except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18).
 
 
Addressing manipulation effects and program awareness 
 
Although CAG-LI and MAB provide a convenient framework to study the causal impact of 
prospective debt on PSE access, there are still reasons to believe that this is not necessarily so. 
First, as with any discontinuity, there is always the possibility of manipulation effects. 
Parents would have a very high incentive to hide their income on aid applications in order to 
help their children qualify for the grant. However, parental income has to match line 236 of 
their income tax returns. In some provinces, tax documents have to be included with the 
student loan application. In other provinces, random checks are applied.  Alternatively, 
parents could manipulate the income reported on their tax files through legitimate or 
illegitimate means. In this case, random checks could not detect manipulation.  
   24 
To test for manipulation effects, I used the LAD data to generate the distribution of net 
parental income around the CAG-LI/MAB threshold among parents in the sample for each of 
the three affected provinces for the years 2003 to 2006. If manipulation effects are present, 
we would expect to see an increase in the proportion of cases just below the threshold (among 
all cases near the threshold)  in the three affected provinces.  However,  there is no such 
evidence in Table 2, which tests for changes within a $1,000 band above and below the 
threshold.   
 
New Brunswick Ontario Manitoba
Year Proportion s.e. Proportion s.e. Proportion s.e.
2003 0.478 *** 0.035 0.458 *** 0.011 0.429 *** 0.032
2004 0.498 *** 0.035 0.481 *** 0.011 0.466 *** 0.033
2005 0.440 *** 0.035 0.475 *** 0.012 0.498 *** 0.034
2006 0.480 *** 0.036 0.471 *** 0.012 0.473 *** 0.032
2005-2004 -0.058 0.049 -0.005 0.016 0.032 0.047
2006-2004 -0.018 0.050 -0.010 0.016 0.006 0.046
2005-2003 -0.038 0.049 0.017 0.016 0.069 0.047
2006-2003 0.002 0.050 0.013 0.016 0.044 0.046
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Table 2: Proportion with net family income below NCBS threshold (within a $1,000 band 
above and below the threshold)
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The
sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17.
 
 
Program awareness is also a potential issue. If students do not know that a program exists, 
there is no reason to believe that they will modify their behaviour because of it. However, all 
students were assessed for CAG-LI and MAB eligibility once they applied for student aid, 
and take up was 100%. Of course, students may not have applied for student aid if they were 
not aware of the new grants since they may not have planned on attending PSE. To help make 
students aware of financial aid opportunities (including loans and grants), the Canadian   25 
government provides a convenient on-line loan calculator.
17
 
 Still, this  measure  is no 
guarantee  that students were made aware of the  programs.  The closest direct form of 
evidence on this issue comes from the Canadian Survey of Youth in 2009 (EKOS, 2009). 
Among 17 to 30 year olds, 70% were aware of government study grant opportunities (that do 
not require repayment) when asked if they had heard of them. Of course, it is not clear why 
individuals in their late 20s (past the typical age of PSE) or youth who have no interest in 
attending PSE would be aware of current study grant opportunities. As a result, the rate of 
awareness among youth who are pondering higher education is almost certainly higher than 
70%. 
Although most youth seemed to be aware of non-refundable grant opportunities, it does not 
mean that they are well-informed about them. For example, some may not realize that 
although they need to apply and qualify for a CSL to be eligible for a grant, they need not 




The first portion of the empirical analysis applies differences-in-differences (DD) regressions. 
The sample sizes and means of the control variables used in the regression are broken down 
by province, year, and NCBS eligibility in Tables A1 to A3 in the Appendix. As can be seen 
from these tables, there are considerable differences in the socio-characteristics of youth in 
families whose income qualifies them (or not) for the NCBS. For example, those who qualify 
for the NCBS are far less likely to attend PSE. The gap is about 15 to 20 percentage points. 
This is likely because of the substantial difference in net parental income. Those who qualify 
                                                 
17 The calculator is available at http://tools.canlearn.ca/cslgs-scpse/cln-cln/40/sfae-eafe/sfae-eafe-0-eng.do.    26 
for the NCBS generally have net parental incomes in the $20,000 to $25,000  range. In 
contrast, net parental income is generally above $80,000 among youth who do not qualify for 
the NCBS. Not surprisingly, this latter group is also less likely to be raised in a lone-parent 
family (only about 5% to 8% of them are in lone-parent families, compared to about 40% for 
youth in families who qualify for the NCBS).  
 
In Table 3, results for models estimated on the three provinces are shown. The models consist 
of regressing a dummy variable indicating PSE attendance on interactions between the grant 
eligibility indicator and the year dummy variables, as well as the control variables described 
above. At the bottom of the table, p-values from various F-tests are shown. In all cases, the p-
values are well above all significance thresholds, indicating the absence of any solid evidence 
that the introduction of the grants raised PSE attendance among low-income youth. 
   27 
Table 3: Results from differences-in-differences estimation of full-time PSE attendance
New Brunswick Ontario Manitoba
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Above NCBS threshold*2004 0.065 ** 0.027 0.023 *** 0.006 0.012 0.021
Above NCBS threshold*2005 0.052 ** 0.026 0.032 *** 0.006 0.011 0.021
Above NCBS threshold*2006 0.054 ** 0.027 0.058 *** 0.006 0.029 0.021
Below NCBS threshold*2003 -0.165 *** 0.035 -0.119 *** 0.010 -0.131 *** 0.029
Below NCBS threshold*2004 -0.132 *** 0.036 -0.095 *** 0.010 -0.123 *** 0.030
Below NCBS threshold*2005 -0.142 *** 0.037 -0.087 *** 0.010 -0.113 *** 0.031
Below NCBS threshold*2006 -0.114 *** 0.037 -0.050 *** 0.011 -0.121 *** 0.031
Lone-parent family -0.053 ** 0.025 -0.085 *** 0.006 -0.082 *** 0.020
Number of children in family 0.099 *** 0.028 0.063 *** 0.007 0.021 0.022
(Number of children in family)
2  -0.013 *** 0.005 -0.009 *** 0.001 -0.003 0.004
Female 0.171 *** 0.016 0.182 *** 0.004 0.162 *** 0.013
Intercept 0.264 *** 0.042 0.251 *** 0.011 0.296 *** 0.035
Adjusted R
2  0.068 0.054 0.048
N 3,710 56,790 5,530
p-values
Impact of threshold (2005 - 2003) 0.5571 0.9771 0.8567
Impact of threshold (2005 - 2004) 0.9503 0.9853 0.7958
Impact of threshold (2006 - 2003) 0.9464 0.4724 0.6552
Impact of threshold (2006 - 2004) 0.5641 0.4688 0.7180
Impact of threshold (2006 - 2005) 0.6114 0.4597 0.5428
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18
year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18).
 
 
Regression discontinuity results 
 
The differences-in-differences approach used in the previous section may suffer from omitted 
factors that may bias the results. Since no significant effects were found, it may still be the 
case that confounding factors worked in the opposite direction, thus ‘masking’ a true effect. 
Rather than attempt to identify all possible confounding factors, an alternative strategy is to 
adopt an approach that is not susceptible to this problem. This is the spirit of this section, as I 
turn to a regression discontinuity (RD) approach. 
   28 
I begin the RD analysis with pictures. In Figures 1 to 4, I show quadratic trends in full-time 
PSE attendance rates by the gap between net parental income and the NCBS threshold in 
Ontario for each year from 2003 to 2006.
 18,19
 
 Separate trend functions are estimated above 
and below the NCBS cut-off (denoted by the vertical bars).  
If the prospective debt reduction programs worked, we should expect to see a higher PSE rate 
when the gap is slightly negative compared to when it is slightly positive in 2005 and 2006 
(the years when the grants were offered), relative to earlier years when the grant was not 
offered. However, there is no evidence of this in the figures. In all years, the trends are 





















































































































































Figure 1: Mean full-time PSE attendance by (net parental 
income-NCBS threshold) - Ontario, 2003
 
Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17,  
except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18). 
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD). 
 
                                                 
18 The raw data from the income tax files could not be shown due to confidentiality concerns. Moreover, since 
the data are binary (attended or not), they would not be informative unless they are smoothed in some way.  




















































































































































Figure 2: Mean full-time PSE attendance by (net parental 
income-NCBS threshold) - Ontario, 2004
 
Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17,  
except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18). 






















































































































































Figure 3: Mean full-time PSE attendance by (net parental 
income-NCBS threshold) - Ontario, 2005
 
 
Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17,  
except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18). 
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD). 
 




















































































































































Figure 4: Mean full-time PSE attendance by (net parental 
income-NCBS threshold) - Ontario, 2006
 
 
Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17,  
except full-time PSE attendance (captured at age 18). 
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD). 
 
In Table 4, I estimate local polynomial regression discontinuity models separately for the 
three provinces in the years when the grants were offered (from 2005 in Ontario and from 
2006 in New Brunswick and Manitoba). These main results appear at the top of the table. The 





                                                 
20 The graphs corresponding to the regressions to follow are not shown in order to conserve space. However, 
they are available upon request.   31 
Table 4: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time postsecondary attendance
New Brunswick Ontario Manitoba
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Main results
   Bandwidth size = 100; year = 2005 0.032 0.025
   Bandwidth size = 100; year = 2006 -0.016 0.125 -0.010 0.024 0.053 0.066
Robustness test #1: Bandwidth size
   Bandwidth size = 50; year = 2005 0.043 0.035
   Bandwidth size = 50; year = 2006 -0.087 0.192 -0.010 0.030 0.034 0.108
   Bandwidth size = 200; year = 2005 0.020 0.024
   Bandwidth size = 200; year = 2006 -0.019 0.085 -0.016 0.024 0.052 0.066
Robustness test #2: Falsification
   Bandwidth size = 100; year = 2003 0.088 0.095 -0.009 0.023 -0.070 0.076
   Bandwidth size = 100; year = 2004 0.104 0.094 0.043 * 0.022 0.017 0.076
   Bandwidth size = 100; year = 2005 -0.109 0.100 -0.084 0.070
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18 year-
old youth. CAG-LI and MAB programs in effect in 2006 in the three provinces, as well as in 2005 in Ontario.
 
 
The results of two robustness tests appear below the main results. First, different bandwidth 
sizes of the polynomial regressions are applied. This had no impact on the results. Second, 
the models are estimated in the pre-grant period (in an attempt to falsify the results). It is 
possible conceivable that the NCBS threshold had a negative impact on PSE attendance prior 
to the introduction of the grants. Perhaps the receipt of the (very small) NCBS payout had 
psychosocial effects on children. In that case, the introduction of the grant may have 
counterbalanced that negative effect, resulting in no overall impact. However, I find no such 
evidence. In fact, the Ontario result is positive and significant at 10% in 2004.    
 
So far, we have considered any form of PSE attendance. However, university academic 
entrance requirements are generally higher than college requirements. As a result, university 
students may be particularly skilled at calculating net returns to attending, and consequently, 
they may be quite sensitive to the debt relief provided by the two grants.      32 
 
In Table 5, the regression discontinuity models are estimated for university attendance.
21
                                                 
21 In the tax files, we only know PSE attendance with certainty since there is no distinction between college and 
university tuition credits and education deductions. However, based on the amount of the tuition credits 
claimed, as well as known tuition fees in Canadian provinces (which are somewhat constant across 
institutions), a series of proxies for university attendance can be created. In the first, I set university 
attendance equal to 1 if tuition credits are at least 80% of mean tuition fees in the province and year in 
question (for one semester only since students normally begin school in September, and the tax year ends in 
December—coinciding with the end of the first semester). I thank Alex Usher, Ross Finnie, and Theresa Qiu 
for providing me with university and college tuition fees, as well as for sharing their imputation approach 
(which I adapted for my own purposes).  
 
Once again, I find no evidence that the grants were associated with an increase in attendance 
for any of the provinces. The bandwidth robustness test shows similar results, while the 
falsification tests do reveal some statistically significant results prior to the grants. A positive 
result is evident for Ontario in 2004 (as with overall PSE attendance). Interestingly, there is a 
negative and significant result in Manitoba in 2005. However, this effect is not significantly 
different than the estimated effect in 2006 (when the grant was introduced).     33 
Table 5: Results from regression discontinuity estimation of full-time university attendance
New Brunswick Ontario Manitoba
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Main results
   Bandwidth size = 100; year = 2005 0.008 0.022
   Bandwidth size = 100; year = 2006 -0.089 0.090 0.001 0.018 0.073 0.057
Robustness test #1: Bandwidth size
   Bandwidth size = 50; year = 2005 0.011 0.031
   Bandwidth size = 50; year = 2006 -0.137 0.114 0.002 0.029 0.054 0.073
   Bandwidth size = 200; year = 2005 -0.002 0.019
   Bandwidth size = 200; year = 2006 -0.059 0.062 -0.002 0.014 0.064 0.044
Robustness test #2: Falsification
   Bandwidth size = 100; year = 2003 0.086 0.078 0.012 0.018 -0.072 0.063
   Bandwidth size = 100; year = 2004 0.086 0.092 0.051 *** 0.018 -0.026 0.069
   Bandwidth size = 100; year = 2005 -0.038 0.101 -0.144 ** 0.070
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: Statistical significance is denoted by "***" (1%), "**" (5%), and "*" (10%). The sample consists of 18 year-
old youth. CAG-LI and MAB programs in effect in 2006 in the three provinces, as well as in 2005 in Ontario.
 
 
Finally, another way of falsifying the results is to find an impact in the rest of Canada, where 
no grants were associated with crossing the NCBS threshold. However, this analysis yielded 




In this study, I estimate the impact of prospective debt load on the probability of PSE 
attendance among youth. To identify this effect, I exploit a setting whereby  two  non-
refundable grants (the Canada Access Grant for Low-income youth and the Millenium 
Access Bursaries) were offered to students, but were clawed back from their calculated loan 
amount. This feature ensured that liquidity constraints remained constant since students were 
offered the same amount of total aid (loans and grants). The only variable factor was the 
amount of aid that had to be repaid. For identification purposes, the interesting (and unique)   34 
feature of the program related to eligibility: students with parental income below a critical 
threshold were eligible to receive the full grant, while those above the threshold could not 
receive the grant. This created a sharp discontinuity in eligibility.  
 
Using a large longitudinal administrative data set that is linked at the family level, I find no 
evidence that the grants helped raise enrolment in PSE or university. This is despite the large 
size of the grants (up to $6,000 or $7,000), the fact that students were automatically assessed 
for the grants with their regular student loans application, and evidence that most Canadian 
youth are at least aware of study grant opportunities (although perhaps not well informed). 
 
Some important policy considerations are worth noting. First, the primary purpose of student 
aid is to raise access to PSE. Based on the results of this study and others, liquidity may be a 
more important factor in this decision than prospective debt. This seems at odds with basic 
basic human capital theory. For example, Linseimeier et al. (2006) showed in a simple two-
period institutional choice model that debt reduction leads to increased net returns, and 
presumably, increased demand for attending the institution in question. Their conclusion is 
easily generalizeable to a model of postsecondary attendance (e.g. Frenette, 2010). However, 
increased demand in either model will only follow if the debt reduction is large enough to 
allow youth to cross the ‘breakeven point’. In actual fact, the net returns to attending 
postsecondary are quite large since the benefits (the increased annual earnings) accrue over a 
lifetime, whereas the costs are only incurred for a few short years. For this reason, only 
students  who view postsecondary as a bad investment may change their decision when 
offered a non-refundable grant. Moreover, it may take a sizeable non-refundable grant to 
make a difference unless there are enough students who are very close to the margin. As a   35 
result,  the windfall economic rents resulting from the two grants may  have been better 
directed towards reducing liquidity constraints for youth who faced them.  
 
But who are these student facing liquidy constraints? One possible group is students who are 
raised in remote areas. They must pay additional costs to attend university, which according 
to Barr-Telford et al. (2003), surpass $5,000 per year. Although student loans are designed to 
cover additional costs (even paying for two return trips home), there are maximum allowable 
loan amounts that substantially limit the aid available to students in need of additional funds 
to cover the cost of moving away to attend.
22
 
 Perhaps as a result of this, several studies in 
Canada have found that distance to school is negatively associated with university attendance, 
especially among low-income youth (e.g. Andres and Looker, 2001; Frenette, 2004, 2006, 
and 2009b).    
Another policy consideration is the level of debt accumulated by PSE students. To this end, 
CAG-LI and MAB no doubt succeeded as they represent an automatic reduction in debt. 
However,  very little evidence exists to support the notion that debt matters. In the US, 
Rothstein and Rouse (2011) examine the impact of the introduction of a “no-loans” policy at 
a highly selective university. Under this new arrangement, the loan component of financial 
aid was replaced with grants. They student debt is associated with poorer post-graduation job 
quality from a ‘public interest’ point of view since these typically pay less. In Canada, the 
                                                 
22 According to http://tools.canlearn.ca/cslgs-scpse/cln-cln/40/sfae-eafe/sfae-eafe-0-eng.do (accessed February 4, 
2011), a single dependent student living at home in a family of four, whose parents earn $80,000, and 
attending university at a cost of $5,000 in tuition, $1,000 in books/supplies, and $500 in computer costs can 
expect to have all of their assessed needs met. An identical student who attends university away from home 
can expect to face $1,307.36 in unmet needs. A similar figure was generated for students in many different 
situations.    36 
evidence does not benefit from causal identification strategy. Luong (2010) uses the Survey 
of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) and descriptive regression analysis to show that 
among postsecondary graduates between the ages of 20 and 45, those who borrowed to attend 
school were ten percentage points less likely  to have investment income and seven 
percentage points less likely to own a home, and had about $39,000 less net worth. The study 
does not look at student debt load, only the incidence of borrowing, so it is difficult to 
conclude that higher debt loads matter. More work is needed in this area, particularly with 
respect to identifiying exogenous variation in student debt. The CAG-LI and MAB grants 
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Table A1: Sample means of variables used in analysis by NCBS eligibility - New Brunswick
2003 2004 2005 2006
Full-time PSE attendance 0.500 0.300 0.556 0.346 0.542 0.333 0.546 0.333
Net parental income 81,800 23,800 79,300 23,700 78,700 23,800 81,600 22,600
Lone-parent family 0.049 0.340 0.059 0.385 0.056 0.422 0.054 0.400
Number of children in family 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.2
Female 0.458 0.480 0.467 0.481 0.465 0.489 0.454 0.444
Sample size 710 250 675 260 710 225 650 225






Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance

















Table A2: Sample means of variables used in analysis by NCBS eligibility - Ontario
2003 2004 2005 2006
Full-time PSE attendance 0.425 0.270 0.447 0.294 0.457 0.304 0.482 0.343
Net parental income 112,000 22,700 114,800 22,700 117,500 22,200 120,800 22,500
Lone-parent family 0.071 0.401 0.079 0.407 0.075 0.398 0.082 0.398
Number of children in family 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
Female 0.492 0.474 0.488 0.478 0.492 0.490 0.490 0.496
Sample size 12,030 2,480 11,690 2,520 11,595 2,550 11,335 2,540





















Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance
(captured at age 18).
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Table A3: Sample means of variables used in analysis by NCBS eligibility - Manitoba
2003 2004 2005 2006
Full-time PSE attendance 0.402 0.237 0.409 0.242 0.407 0.246 0.427 0.241
Net parental income 89,000 24,100 90,000 23,000 93,800 23,800 97,000 24,400
Lone-parent family 0.058 0.390 0.068 0.339 0.067 0.421 0.068 0.370
Number of children in family 2.8 3.1 2.8 3 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.9
Female 0.482 0.475 0.473 0.468 0.478 0.456 0.491 0.463
Sample size 1,120 295 1,100 310 1,045 285 1,100 270
Source: Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD).
Notes: The sample consists of 18 year-old youth. All variables are captured at age 17, except full-time PSE attendance
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